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1191 
HOW THE GUN CONTROL ACT DISARMS BLACK 
FIREARM OWNERS 
Maya Itah 
Abstract: Through 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Gun Control Act (GCA) outlaws the possession 
of a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. The statute’s language is broad, and 
federal courts have interpreted it expansively. By giving prosecutors wide discretion in 
charging individuals with § 924(c) violations, the language enables the disproportionate 
incarceration of Black firearm owners. 
This Comment addresses this issue in three parts. Part I discusses the ways early gun 
control laws overtly disarmed Black firearm owners. Additionally, Part I provides context for 
the passage of the Gun Control Act of 1968, which coincided with the backlash to the Civil 
Rights Movement. Next, Part II outlines the ways different circuits have interpreted § 924(c), 
demonstrating how those interpretations disadvantage Black defendants. Finally, Part III puts 
forth two proposals for reform: interpreting § 924(c) more narrowly, or simply removing the 
language at issue from the GCA. These reforms would reduce racial disparities in the 
enforcement of § 924(c). They would also reaffirm the right of Black Americans to keep and 
bear arms for self-defense. 
INTRODUCTION 
Two contrasting cases—the first involving a Black defendant, and the 
second involving a white defendant—illustrate the racially disparate 
application of the Gun Control Act (GCA).1 In the first case, United States 
v. Bell,2 officers in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, forced their way into Reecie 
Humphrey’s home, breaking down her door with a battering ram.3 The 
officers charged into a bedroom and found two people naked and asleep: 
Ms. Humphrey herself, and Pierre Bell, her partner.4 As soon as Ms. 
Humphrey and Mr. Bell put on clothes, the officers arrested them both.5 
 
J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. The author worked on an 
appeal of a § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) conviction as a summer intern. I want to thank Dennis Carroll and the 
rest of the team at the Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Washington for helping me 
come up with the idea for this piece. I also want to thank Professor Mary D. Fan for helping me turn 
that idea into a full-fledged Comment, and my colleagues at Washington Law Review—especially 
Celeste Ajayi, Luke Sturgeon, and Caroline Sung—for their insightful edits. Finally, I want to thank 
my family and friends for all their support. 
1. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–28). 
2. 477 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 2007). 
3. Id. at 610; Brief for Appellant at 5, Bell, 477 F.3d 607 (No. 06-2802). 
4. Brief for Appellant at 5, Bell, 477 F.3d 607 (No. 06-2802). 
5. Bell, 477 F.3d at 610. 
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When the officers searched the bedroom, they identified two things that 
ultimately landed Mr. Bell in federal prison.6 First, they found a wallet 
containing Mr. Bell’s identification card and roughly seven grams of 
crack cocaine.7 Second, they uncovered a handgun buried “between the 
mattresses on [Mr.] Bell’s side of the bed.”8 
The prosecution charged Mr. Bell with possessing crack cocaine with 
intent to distribute, possessing a firearm as a person with a felony 
conviction, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime.9 He went to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Arkansas.10 During the trial, Arkansas State Police Sergeant 
Don Sanders testified that the amount of crack cocaine in the wallet 
suggested that Mr. Bell was trafficking drugs, and that “drug dealers 
commonly possess firearms to protect themselves, their illegal goods, and 
their illegal proceeds.”11 
A jury convicted Mr. Bell of all three counts.12 For possessing a firearm 
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, the court sentenced Mr. Bell, a 
Black man in his thirties,13 to sixty months of incarceration14—the 
mandatory minimum.15 The court imposed this sentence on top of a 144-
month sentence for dealing drugs and a 120-month sentence for 
possessing the firearm in the first place.16 
On appeal, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[t]he evidence 
 
6. Id. at 610–11. 
7. Id. at 610. 
8. Id. At a suppression hearing, Mr. Bell testified that officers held a machine gun to his head while 
he was naked, assaulted him, threatened to tase him, and ignored his request to speak with his lawyer. 
Ms. Humphrey testified that the handgun was actually hers, and that a police officer said her children 
would be removed from her if she did not say that the drugs and gun belonged to Mr. Bell. The trial 
court did not credit their testimony. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 5–7. 
9. Bell, 477 F.3d at 609–10.  
10. Id. at 607. 
11. Id. at 611. 
12. Id. 
13. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ 
[https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “Pierre Bell” into the search 
bar; then select “Search”). 
14. Bell, 477 F.3d at 610. 
15. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). A mandatory minimum sentence is one the court must give a 
defendant who violates a specific statute, regardless of the defendant’s personal circumstances or the 
specific facts of the crime. See Sentencing 101, FAMM, https://famm.org/our-work/sentencing-
reform/sentencing-101/ [https://perma.cc/4UR4-YYZX]. 
16. Bell, 477 F.3d at 610. For a discussion of how criminalizing the possession of firearms by 
people with felonies disparately impacts Black firearm owners, see generally Emma Luttrell 
Shreefter, Federal Felon-in-Possession Gun Laws: Criminalizing a Status, Disparately Affecting 
Black Defendants, and Continuing the Nation’s Centuries-Old Methods to Disarm Black 
Communities, 21 CUNY L. REV. 143 (2018). 
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was sufficient to support [Mr.] Bell’s conviction for possessing a firearm 
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).17 The 
court noted that the officers who entered the bedroom “observed Bell 
apparently reaching for the revolver” and that the gun was “proximately 
located to” the crack cocaine.18 It reasoned that “[t]hese facts, while not 
overwhelming, support an inference that Bell possessed the revolver in 
furtherance of his possession with intent to distribute the crack cocaine.”19 
The next case, United States v. Rockey,20 involves a white defendant. It 
contrasts starkly with Mr. Bell’s case, illustrating the disparate impact of 
§ 924(c) on Black firearm owners. Mr. Bell, who possessed a few grams 
of crack while keeping a gun in the home where he slept, received the 
same sentence for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime as William Eugene Rockey,21 a white man in his forties.22 Mr. 
Rockey was driving down a highway in Oklahoma when a police officer 
attempted to pull him over.23 In response, Mr. Rockey led the officer on a 
high-speed chase.24 At one point, he stuck a handgun out the window and 
fired two rounds.25 Mr. Rockey ended the chase by abandoning the truck 
and fleeing into a nearby forest.26 Two days later, police found him in the 
woods.27 Along with “a loaded Ruger Super Blackhawk .44 Magnum 
affixed with a scope,” Mr. Rockey possessed a number of items useful for 
manufacturing methamphetamine: lithium batteries, a syringe, iodine, and 
ephedrine.28 Possessing ephedrine is illegal under the Controlled 
Substances Act.29 
Mr. Bell and Mr. Rockey engaged in plainly different courses of 
conduct. Mr. Bell was asleep in his partner’s room, where a gun and a 
 
17. Bell, 477 F.3d at 613; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
18. Bell, 477 F.3d at 614. 
19. Id. 
20. 449 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 2006). 
21. Id. at 1102. Given that Mr. Rockey discharged the firearm, it is unclear why he didn’t receive 
a ten-year sentence instead. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (“[A]ny person who . . . in furtherance 
of [a drug trafficking crime], possesses a firearm, shall . . . if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.”).   
22. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ 
[https://perma.cc/VNM4-U8VM] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “William Eugene Rocky” 
into the search bar; then select “Search”). 





28. Id. at 1102–03.  
29. Id. at 1103 (citing Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2)). 
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small quantity of drugs were present; Mr. Rockey shot at officers, ran 
from them, and had both a firearm and a controlled substance in his bag 
when he was arrested. Together, these cases demonstrate two things about 
§ 924(c). First, the statute criminalizes a wide range of conduct. The range 
is so wide that it is hard to determine what generally ties § 924(c) 
convictions together, beyond the existence of a defendant who possessed 
drugs and a gun at the same point in time. Second, because of this range, 
prosecutors have significant discretion in deciding which defendants to 
charge with the crime. Why did Mr. Bell serve the same sentence as Mr. 
Rockey? Unlike Mr. Bell, Mr. Rockey actually fired a handgun.30 
Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of ten 
years on defendants who discharge firearms,31 so the fact that both men 
were sentenced to five years is particularly strange. Although the record 
does not indicate what role race might have played in the prosecutors’ 
charging decisions, Mr. Bell’s Blackness likely accounts for the sentence 
he received.32 
This Comment explores how the federal courts’ broad interpretation of 
§ 924(c) makes room for the disparate criminalization of gun ownership 
by Black individuals. There are many cases like Mr. Bell’s: police find 
drugs and a gun in the same room; at trial, an expert witness—typically a 
member of law enforcement—testifies that drug dealers often own guns; 
the jury convicts, and the defendant goes to prison. The defendant in 
question is disproportionately likely to be Black.33 Along with a separate 
term of imprisonment for selling drugs, that defendant will serve a 
sentence of at least five years34 and become ineligible for legal gun 
ownership.35 
In establishing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s racially disparate impact, this 
Comment begins by looking at the history of gun control in the United 
States. Part I gives a brief overview of the ways gun control has disarmed 
Black Americans, both directly and indirectly. It also contextualizes the 
passage of the GCA, the first attempt at comprehensive federal gun 
control and the source of § 924(c). A general analysis of the benefits and 
drawbacks of gun control policies is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Rather than carrying out that analysis, Part I simply addresses the fact that, 
historically, legislators have used gun control laws to prevent Black 
 
30. Id.  
31. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
32. See infra Part II. 
33. See infra text accompanying notes 150–53.  
34. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 
35. Id. § 922(g)(1) (forbidding people with felony convictions from possessing “in or affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition”).  
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Americans from owning firearms. Part II discusses the ways federal 
courts have interpreted § 924(c) in the last two decades, focusing on the 
ways courts have dismissed Black defendants’ assertion of the right to 
self-defense. Part III proposes two reforms that address the harm § 924(c) 
imposes on Black firearm owners. The first reform is a narrower 
interpretation of § 924(c) that focuses on whether the defendant had a 
culpable mental state. This interpretation would reduce the disparate 
impact of § 924(c) on Black individuals; along with curbing prosecutorial 
discretion, it would give defenses rooted in the right to self-defense the 
opportunity to succeed. The second reform is an outright repeal of the 
language in § 924(c) that criminalizes possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 
I. THE RACIST IMPACT OF GUN CONTROL IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The GCA is racially neutral on its face, but it wreaks a racially 
disproportionate impact.36 The GCA’s statement of purpose declares that 
the Act supports “law enforcement officials in their fight against crime 
and violence.”37 The Act also states that it does not punish “law-abiding 
citizens” who use firearms for “hunting, trapshooting, target shooting, 
personal protection, or any other lawful activity.”38 Nearly every type of 
firearm use Congress explicitly endorsed involves shooting for sport, a 
white-coded activity.39 Congress could have listed other purposes that 
lack this strong association with white communities—for example, many 
 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 150–53; see, e.g., Holloway v. United States, No. 01-CV-
1017, 2014 WL 1942923, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (“Black men like Holloway have long been 
disproportionately subjected to the ‘stacking’ of § 924(c) counts.” (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 363 (2011))); Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 
1712 (2012) (“With political momentum for gun control heightened, in October 1968 the 
President . . . signed into law the Gun Control Act of 1968, which . . . ‘represented a backlash against 
armed [Black individuals] who were seen to be undermining social order.’” (quoting ADAM 
WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 247 (2011))); 
David E. Patton, Criminal Justice Reform and Guns: The Irresistible Movement Meets the Immovable 
Object, 69 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1013 (2020) (“In 2018, consistent with most years, approximately 72% 
of people sentenced for federal firearm offenses were Black or [Latinx].”). See generally Shreefter, 
supra note 16. 
37. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213–14. 
38. Id. 
39. See Jay Mechling, Boy Scouts, the National Rifle Association, and the Domestication of Rifle 
Shooting, 53 AM. STUD. 5, 23 (2014) (discussing the image of the wholesome white youth who 
engages in target shooting); Louis Warren, Book Review, 89 J. AM. HIST. 621, 621 (2002) (reviewing 
DANIEL JUSTIN HERMAN, HUNTING AND THE AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2001)) (“By the end of the 
nineteenth century . . . white middle-class Americans turned to hunting to establish themselves as 
natives in a country of new immigrants.”).  
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people own guns because their jobs require them to carry firearms, or 
because they inherited firearms from relatives40—but it did not. 
Shining a light on the GCA’s historical context reveals why the Act 
disproportionately punishes Black people for owning firearms. As former 
professional basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar recently wrote in the 
Los Angeles Times, “Racism in America is like dust in the air. It seems 
invisible—even if you’re choking on it—until you let the sun in.”41 
This Part examines the GCA in view of the history of gun control. Laws 
restricting firearm access have long targeted Black people and members 
of other marginalized groups, first overtly and later covertly. Even if the 
GCA’s drafters lacked the explicit intent to disarm Black people, the Act 
ultimately achieved that same result. 
A. Direct Prohibition: From the Colonial Period to Dred Scott42 
The link between firearm ownership and political power has English 
roots. During the first half of the 1600s, the English monarchy frequently 
restricted the use of firearms, fearing “the dangers associated with having 
a large number of English commoners armed with handguns, muskets, 
and pikes.”43 The fear of armed commoners persisted in the latter half of 
the century. For example, a 1670 statute declared that “no person, other 
than heirs of the nobility, could have a gun unless he owned land” of a 
certain value.44 England’s population thus became “intimately familiar 
with the capricious ways in which arms, political power, and self-
determination might link together.”45 Later, in 1765, English jurist 
William Blackstone “asserted that constitutional guarantees unsupported 
by citizens’ private firearms are guarantees in name only.”46 
Colonizers from England brought their beliefs about firearms to 
America. They saw gun ownership as a necessary means for securing their 
political freedoms as well as their homes.47 Thus, it is significant that, in 
 
40. Guns, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx [https://perma.cc/952Z-PBYL]. 
41. Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Opinion, Don’t Understand the Protests? What You’re Seeing Is People 
Pushed to the Edge, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2020, 7:29 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-05-30/dont-understand-the-protests-what-youre-
seeing-is-people-pushed-to-the-edge (last visited Sept. 19, 2021). 
42. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
43. DONALD J. CAMPBELL, AMERICA’S GUN WARS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GUN CONTROL IN 
THE UNITED STATES 17 (2019). 
44. Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the Second 
Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 970 (1975).   
45. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 18. 
46. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).  
47. Id. at 20. 
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1640, the Colony of Virginia passed a law excluding Black people from 
owning guns—the first restrictive law of any kind concerning the 
Colony’s Black population.48 Throughout the Colonies, similar laws 
prevented Black people, free or enslaved, from possessing firearms.49 
The founding of the United States did not change matters. Many states 
made it illegal for Black people to possess firearms “in order to maintain 
[them] in their servile status,”50 in spite of provisions in state constitutions 
analogous to the Second Amendment,51 which states that “the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms[] shall not be infringed.”52 Representing the 
United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney rationalized the 
disarmament of Black people in Dred Scott v. Sandford.53 He wrote that 
the slaveholding states would have never accepted a Constitution that 
gave Black people citizenship, because such a document “would give 
them the full liberty . . . to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and 
to keep and carry arms wherever they went.”54 
B. Indirect Prohibition: Reconstruction and the Muzzling of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
After the Civil War, the United States government gave Black 
Americans citizenship by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment.55 In 
theory, Black citizens became white citizens’ political equals. In practice, 
states found ways to continue denying Black people fundamental rights, 
including the right to bear arms. 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s framers intended it to secure a panoply 
of rights, among them “an individual right to own and keep guns in one’s 
home for self-protection.”56 The Framers of the Constitution likely 
understood the Second Amendment as guaranteeing the rights of a 
militia—comprising “the people” rather than professional soldiers—to 
 
48. Stefan B. Tahmassebi, Gun Control and Racism, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 67, 69 (1991); see 
CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 24. 
49. See CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 24. 
50. Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 67. 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. II; Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 67, 70. The Second Amendment did not 
apply to the states until the Supreme Court so held in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 
749 (2010). 
52. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
53. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
54. Id. at 417. 
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
56. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 
UTAH L. REV. 889, 899. 
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use firearms for the protection of the republic, fulfilling a duty akin to jury 
service.57 However, the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers “significantly 
recast the right to weapons.”58 In a sense, they agreed with Justice Taney 
that citizenship implied the right to own a firearm for self-defense.59 They 
saw the ability to keep a gun at home for self-defense as “a true ‘privilege’ 
or ‘immunity’ of citizens.”60 In particular, they felt that Black people 
living in the South “could not always count on the local police to keep 
white night-riders at bay,” and thus needed to be able to count on 
themselves.61 
However, the United States Supreme Court made no discernable effort 
to reaffirm the vision of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers. In United 
States v. Cruikshank,62 an 1875 case, the Court held that the Second 
Amendment “has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national 
government.”63 The facts of Cruikshank make the case worth scrutinizing 
closely. In 1872, an election for the governor of Louisiana led to a “hotly 
contested” split between the Republican and Democratic candidates.64 
While both candidates claimed victory, a federal judge declared that the 
Republican candidate won.65 
Fearing that the Democrats—who were mostly former slave owners—
would nonetheless try to take control of the regional government, an all-
Black militia seized the local courthouse in 1873.66 Thus began the Colfax 
Massacre: a group of white men forced the Black militiamen to surrender 
 
57. See Amar, supra note 56, at 892–94; see also Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second 
Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 646–47 (1989) (“There is strong evidence that ‘militia’ refers to all 
of the people, or at least of all of those treated as full citizens of the community.”). 
58. Amar, supra note 56, at 898. 
59. See id. at 900; see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of 
the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 256 (1983) (explaining that “proscribing anti-gun 
laws was expressly contemplated by the authors of the . . . fourteenth amendment”). 
60. Amar, supra note 56, at 899 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). 
61. Id. at 899, 911.   
62. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
63. Id. at 553; see also Leslie Friedman Goldstein, The Second Amendment, the Slaughter-House 
Cases (1873), and United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 365, 369 (2008) (“In 
Cruikshank the Court made explicit . . . that neither the First nor Second Amendments are 
incorporated against the state governments as privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens.”).  
64. Danny Lewis, The 1873 Colfax Massacre Crippled the Reconstruction Era, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG.: SMART NEWS (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/1873-colfax-
massacre-crippled-reconstruction-180958746/ [https://perma.cc/922P-T8X9]. 
65. William Briggs & Jon Krakauer, Opinion, The Massacre that Emboldened White Supremacists, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/opinion/black-lives-civil-
rights.html [https://perma.cc/4HML-TTFR]. 
66. See Lewis, supra note 64. 
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and then murdered an estimated 150 of them.67 Following the massacre, 
the federal government convicted three of the white perpetrators68 under 
the Enforcement Act of 1870,69 which made it illegal “to join in a 
conspiracy to deprive any citizen of ‘a right or privilege . . . secured to 
him by the Constitution.’”70 The indictment alleged that the perpetrators, 
among other things, intended to prevent two Black citizens from 
exercising the “right to keep and bear arms for a lawful purpose.”71 The 
perpetrators challenged the indictment, and the United States Supreme 
Court ultimately set the convictions aside.72 In its opinion, the Court 
announced that the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose “is not a right 
granted by the Constitution.”73 It reasoned that the Second Amendment 
merely “declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, 
means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.”74 
Cruikshank implicitly gave states permission to prevent Black people 
from possessing firearms. As a result, Black people “were routinely 
disarmed by Southern States after the Civil War.”75 States’ methods 
included banning cheap handguns (“the only firearms the poverty-stricken 
freedmen could afford”),76 imposing business or transaction taxes on 
handguns, giving the police discretion over the granting of firearms 
licenses, and simply continuing to enforce pre-emancipation statutes.77 
The Court did not reverse its position on the Second Amendment until 
2010, holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago78 that the Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense is “among those 
fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered liberty”79 and “is 
fully applicable to the States.”80 The United States Supreme Court’s 
refusal to give the federal government greater power in enforcing civil 
 
67. Id. 
68. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 546; see Justice John Paul Stevens, Glittering Generalities and 
Historical Myths, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 419, 423 (2013).  
69. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. 
70. Martha T. McCluskey, Facing the Ghost of Cruikshank in Constitutional Law, 65 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 278, 281 (2015) (quoting Enforcement Act of 1870 § 6). 
71. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 545 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II).  
72. Id. at 559.  
73. Id. at 553. 
74. Id. 
75. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 614 (2008). 
76. Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 73. 
77. See id. at 73–75; Stephen P. Halbrook, To Bear Arms for Self-Defense: A “Right of the People” 
or a Privilege of the Few?, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 46, 47 (2020). 
78. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
79. Id. at 778. 
80. Id. at 750.  
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rights paved the way for the Jim Crow era and its attendant violence.81 
C. Federal Prohibition: The Twentieth Century and the Beginnings of 
Federal Gun Control 
In the early twentieth century, the Jim Crow era’s midpoint, widespread 
racism and xenophobia led the Ku Klux Klan to surge in popularity.82 
Klan members often furthered the practice of restricting Black people’s 
access to guns.83 For example, in 1906, Mississippi passed a law 
“requiring retailers to maintain records of all pistol and pistol ammunition 
sales, and to make such available to authorities for inspection.”84 The 
authorities in question often belonged to the Ku Klux Klan.85 Contrary to 
conventional narratives about racism in the United States, the Klan’s 
popularity was not limited to the South.86 The organization “was present 
in force in southern New Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and 
Oregon.”87 Public support for white supremacy and nationalism may 
explain why “[a]ll of these states enacted either handgun permit laws or 
laws barring alien handgun possession between 1913 and 1934.”88 
General calls for gun control rose in tandem with the number of people 
moving to cities and the number of people immigrating to the United 
States. By the start of the 1920s, more than half of Americans lived in 
cities, and many city residents had recently arrived in America.89 
Significantly, the newcomers came mostly from Eastern and Southern 
Europe and did not readily blend into America’s dominant culture, 
defined by white, Protestant settlers from Western Europe.90 United States 
citizens’ “free-floating fears and suspicions, in concert with the rampant 
crime already prevalent, spurred significant numbers of city 
dwellers . . . to question the ready availability of firearms in such high-
 
81. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 348–49 (1991); McCluskey, supra note 70, at 281. 
82. See generally Joshua D. Rothman, When Bigotry Paraded Through the Streets, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 4, 2016),  https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/second-klan/509468/ 
[https://perma.cc/98KQ-7HRR] (discussing the Klan’s cultural and political prominence in the 
1920s). 
83. See Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 71–76. 
84. Shreefter, supra note 16, at 169 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Congress of Racial Equality 
in Support of Respondent at *18, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290). 
85. Id. 
86. Tahmassebi, supra note 48, at 78. 
87. Id. 
88. Id.  
89. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 34–35. 
90. See id. at 35. 
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density environments proffering so much anonymity and easy mobility.”91 
For example, the first person convicted under New York’s Sullivan Act 
of 1911,92 which “mandated police-issued licenses for handguns and made 
it a felony to carry an unlicensed concealed weapon,”93 was an Italian 
worker who carried a firearm for self-defense.94 The judge sentenced him 
to a year in prison.95 In doing so, he said, “[i]t is unfortunate that this is 
the custom with you and your kind, and that fact, combined with your 
irascible nature, furnishes much of the criminal business in this 
country.”96 
The idea that gun control reduces violent crime became “a basic theme” 
among lawmakers who favored restrictions on the sale and ownership of 
firearms.97 During the New Deal, when the federal government 
implemented wide-reaching programs to alleviate the effects of the Great 
Depression, people began “to think of crime control as a national problem 
meriting substantial federal regulation.”98 Accordingly, lawmakers started 
having the first serious discussions about federal firearms regulation.99 
This period brought about the precursors to the GCA: the National 
Firearms Act of 1934100 and the Federal Firearm Act of 1938.101 The 
former taxed the manufacturing, selling, and transportation of certain 
types of firearms; the latter went further, requiring firearm manufacturers, 
importers, and dealers to obtain a federal license and prohibiting people 
with felonies from purchasing guns.102 While the GCA repealed the 
Federal Firearms Act in 1968, it reenacted many of its provisions.103 
 
91. Id.  
92. Sullivan Act of 1911, ch. 195, § 1, 1911 N.Y. Laws 442, 442. 
93. Michael A. Walsh, The Strange Birth of NY’s Gun Laws, N.Y. POST (Jan. 16, 2012, 5:00 AM), 
https://nypost.com/2012/01/16/the-strange-birth-of-nys-gun-laws/ [https://perma.cc/5VUL-QMC6]. 
94. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 32–33. 
95. Id. at 33. 
96. Id.  
97. See id. at 41–42. 
98. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 133, 136 (1975). 
99. Id. at 137. 
100. Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236. 
101. Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250; see also Zimring, supra note 98, at 138. 
102. Sarah Gray, Here’s a Timeline of the Major Gun Control Laws in America, TIME (Apr. 30, 
2019, 11:13 AM), https://time.com/5169210/us-gun-control-laws-history-timeline/ 
[https://perma.cc/8USP-66U4]. 
103. Id.; see also MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45629, FEDERAL FIREARMS LAWS: 
OVERVIEW AND SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 2 (2019) (“In addition to 
expanding the [Federal Firearms Act’s] licensing scheme and categories of prohibited persons—
which largely had been restricted to certain criminals—the GCA augmented the criminal penalties 
available for violations and established procedures for obtaining relief from firearm disabilities.”).  
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D. Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement 
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s provided fuel for crime-
fearing gun control advocates. The narrative of a nation “speeding toward 
anarchy” arose, gaining momentum when “major clashes between police 
and [B]lack Americans erupted” in the summer of 1964.104 Another wave 
of protests washed over the country in the summer of 1967; many of those 
protests turned violent.105 
In response to widespread police brutality, Black activists began to 
advocate for self-defense through firearm possession. A New York protest 
spurred by the shooting and killing of James Powell, a Black fifteen-year-
old, led a police commissioner to state that he would treat the protest as a 
crime problem rather than a social problem, to which Malcolm X 
responded, “[t]here are probably more armed Negroes in Harlem than in 
any other spot on earth. If the people who are armed get involved in this, 
you can bet they’ll really have something on their hands.”106 
The Black Panthers107 “adopted [Malcom X’s] perspective on guns as 
their own,”108 taking action in ways that “led whites, including 
conservative Republicans, to support new gun control.”109 The Black 
Panthers began a practice of following the police while armed and 
 
104. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 59. It is worth noting that many commentators have expressed 
concern around the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests using similar language. See, e.g., Charles Creitz, 
Ex-Civil Rights Activist Says Black Lives Matter Using ‘Low-Income Black America . . . to Promote 
Insurrection’, FOX NEWS (June 24, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/media/bob-woodson-black-
lives-matter-insurrection-anarchy [https://perma.cc/9JA6-JJHJ] (quoting an activist’s claim that 
“low-income black America are [sic] being used by the group to promote insurrection in the country, 
and anarchy”); Tom Cotton, Opinion, Tom Cotton: Send in the Troops, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/opinion/tom-cotton-protests-military.html 
[https://perma.cc/W9LF-VAC7] (beginning a piece on the Black Lives Matter protests by announcing 
that “Midtown Manhattan descended into lawlessness”).  
105. Adam Winkler, The Secret History of Guns, ATLANTIC, Sept. 2011, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/the-secret-history-of-guns/308608/ 
[https://perma.cc/8GMS-B88N]. 
106. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 59 (quoting FRED SHAPIRO & JAMES SULLIVAN, RACE RIOTS: 
NEW YORK 1964, at 67 (1964)). 
107. The Black Panther Party, founded by Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale in 1966, is a “black 
revolutionary party” that began by “[establishing] neighborhood patrols and [protecting] residents 
from police brutality.” The Black Panther Party, HOW. UNIV. L. LIBR., 
https://library.law.howard.edu/civilrightshistory/bpp [https://perma.cc/Q73B-XKQK]. It “ultimately 
evolved into a Marxist revolutionary group that fought for African American weapon rights, 
exemption from ‘white American’ sanctions, and financial compensation for years of racial 
exploitation.” Id. The organization also delivered social services, “providing access to medical clinics 
and free breakfasts for children.” Id. The Federal Bureau of Investigation “considered the Black 
Panthers an enemy of the U.S. government” and “used a combination of sabotage and 
misinformation” in its efforts to dismantle it. Id.   
108. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 65. 
109. Winkler, supra note 105. 
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shouting out legal advice to Black arrestees as officers were arresting 
them.110 Most famously, in 1967, thirty armed Black Panthers climbed the 
steps of the California State Capitol building and “announced . . . that 
racist legislatures would no longer keep black people disarmed and 
powerless” and that “the time had come for [B]lacks to arm 
themselves.”111 They then entered the building with their firearms.112 
The 1968 report from the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, commissioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson,113 sheds light 
on the federal government’s conflicting reactions to the Civil Rights 
Movement. On one hand, the Johnson Administration wanted to address 
the protestors’ grievances. The report has been lauded for recognizing 
institutional racism,114 as it spent significant time discussing social 
programs and other ways of addressing racial inequity. On the other hand, 
the report demonstrates a certain anxiety around the protestors’ desire to 
disrupt the status quo. The report states that “[the typical rioter] takes great 
pride in his race and believes that in some respects Negroes are superior 
to whites. . . . He is more likely to be actively engaged in civil rights 
efforts, but is extremely distrustful of the political system.”115 Moreover, 
the report discussed so-called “legal tools,” a euphemism for criminal 
statutes: “A Commission survey of selected police departments revealed 
no basic lack of legal tools available to control disorders, but the survey 
and other evidence have, however, indicated five other areas where further 
legislation may be necessary.”116 According to the report, law 
enforcement needed more “legal tools” for controlling firearm use: “The 
fact that firearms can readily be acquired is an obviously dangerous factor 
in dealing with civil disorders. . . . We therefore support the President’s 
call for gun control legislation and urge its prompt enactment.”117 
Calls for criminal sanctions may seem out-of-place in a report that, at 
least to some extent, meaningfully engaged with the protestors’ demands. 
However, white liberals who sympathized with the Civil Rights 
Movement often called for gun control in order to reconcile that sympathy 
 
110. Id. 
111. CAMPBELL, supra note 43, at 67–68. 
112. Id. 
113. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, at v (1968). 
114. See generally Alice George, The 1968 Kerner Commission Got It Right, but Nobody Listened, 
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-
institution/1968-kerner-commission-got-it-right-nobody-listened-180968318/ 
[https://perma.cc/77RG-3LGW]. 
115. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, supra note 113, at 73–74. 
116. Id. at 289. 
117. Id. 
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with beliefs about the inherent criminality of young Black men: “The fear 
of ‘the criminal’ . . . a white person on the political left may feel is 
intolerable. It cannot fit within the core self-concept of ‘I am a good 
person; I am not a racist.’”118 By projecting that fear onto a criminal 
object—the firearm—white liberals were able to channel it in a seemingly 
neutral way.119 
E. The Birth of the Gun Control Act of 1968 
In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent Congress a message calling 
for “active combat against crime.”120 Noting that the national crime rate 
had doubled since 1940,121 President Johnson proposed that Congress 
respond by regulating firearms more tightly.122 Two national tragedies 
also increased Congress’s willingness to take on gun control: the 
assassinations of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and Senator Robert 
F. Kennedy in 1968.123 Finally, in late 1968, the GCA became law.124 
Upon signing the GCA, President Johnson announced, “Today we begin 
to disarm the criminal and the careless and the insane. All of our people 
who are deeply concerned in this country about law and order should hail 
this day.”125 
As President Johnson’s remarks indicate, one of the GCA’s major 
objectives was “[d]enying access to firearms to certain congressionally 
defined groups,”126 such as people with felony convictions—who were 
(and still are)127 disproportionately Black.128 Mass incarceration, a term 
recognizing the United States’ role as “the world’s leading jailer,”129 has 
 
118. Eric Primm, Robert M. Regoli & John D. Hewitt, Race, Fear, and Firearms: The Roles of 
Demographics and Guilt Assuagement in the Creation of a Political Partition, 13 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 
63, 69–70 (2008). 
119. Id. at 70. 
120. 1 HARRY L. WILSON, GUN POLITICS IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND MODERN DOCUMENTS IN 
CONTEXT 182 (2016). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 187.  
123. See Zimring, supra note 98, at 146–47.  
124. Id. at 147. 
125. WILSON, supra note 120, at 215. 
126. Zimring, supra note 98, at 149. 
127. Race & Justice News: One-Third of Black Men Have Felony Convictions, SENT’G PROJECT: 
RACE & JUST. NEWS (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/5593/ 
[https://perma.cc/BG85-TBN9] (reporting that in 2010, 33% of Black men had a felony conviction, 
compared with 13% of all adult men).   
128. See Zimring, supra note 98, at 149; Shreefter, supra note 16, at 157.  
129. Katherine Beckett & Megan Ming Francis, The Origins of Mass Incarceration: The Racial 
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a disparate effect on Black people, who are “5.9 times as likely to be 
incarcerated”130 as white people. The beginnings of mass incarceration 
emerged during the Civil Rights Movement, and political leaders who 
opposed the movement “systematically and strategically linked 
opposition to civil rights legislation to calls for law and order.”131 Those 
calls for law and order bore fruit with the launch of the War on Drugs, a 
collection of policy decisions “that framed drug users . . . as 
criminals . . . who deserved only incarceration and punishment.”132 As the 
War on Drugs commenced, the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence took a “sharp turn,” making it easier for police 
officers to stop and search people with minimal justification.133 For 
example, in Terry v. Ohio,134 the Court held that a police officer may 
conduct “a reasonable search for weapons . . . where he has reason to 
believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, 
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a 
crime.”135 The lack of constraints on officers’ investigatory tactics, 
combined with prosecutors’ enormous discretion and the intense 
surveillance of people released on probation or parole, contributes to the 
disproportionate incarceration of Black people.136 In the mid-1980s, the 
number of Black people sent to prison on drug charges almost quadrupled; 
by 2000, that number was more than twenty-six times higher than it had 
been in 1983.137 During that time, the number of white people sent to 
prison rose, too—but only by a factor of eight.138 While the incarceration 
 
Politics of Crime and Punishment in the Post-Civil Rights Era, 16 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433, 434 
(2020).  
130. THE SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 1 (2018) (citing E. ANN CARSON, U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., NCJ 251149, PRISONERS IN 2016 (2018)), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-
report-on-racial-disparities/ [https://perma.cc/9KRZ-SK5P]. 
131. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 40 (2d ed. 2020).  
132. Emily Dufton, The War on Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime, ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-war-on-drugs-how-
president-nixon-tied-addiction-to-crime/254319/ [https://perma.cc/6KXP-HJFA]. 
133. ALEXANDER, supra note 131, at 78–83, 85–87.  
134. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
135. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). The Court further held that “in determining whether the officer 
acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to 
draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id. (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
174–176 (1949)). 
136.  ALEXANDER, supra note 131, at 109, 119, 122. 
137. Id. at 96. 
138. Id. 
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rates suggest otherwise, most people who illegally use or sell drugs are 
white.139 
Relatedly, the importation of cheap handguns—dubbed “Saturday 
Night Specials”—was a concern for Congress.140 In congressional 
testimony, “[t]he image projected was not just that of a gun but of a gun 
and a user class. And the goal implicit in the legislation apparently was to 
reduce access to guns for high-risk groups by restricting the supply of 
cheap guns, particularly cheap handguns.”141 When the GCA passed, 
many Black households were suffering economically: during the 1960s, 
the disappearance of high-paying manufacturing jobs combined with 
white flight to create “whole urban pockets with high unemployment for 
Black men.”142 As a result, restrictions on the importation of cheap 
handguns likely had a disparate impact on Black individuals. 
Additionally, although the origin of the term “Saturday Night Special” is 
not entirely clear, some scholars have contended that it comes from the 
phrase “n****r-town Saturday night,”143 which police used to express 
indifference toward violence in Black neighborhoods.144 It is hard to 
escape the conclusion that legislators—intentionally or not—saw the user 
class they wanted to restrict as predominantly Black. 
Moreover, the GCA had less of an impact on firearm supply and more 
of an impact on firearm convictions.145 The Act caused a shift in the 
manpower priorities of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives (ATF): the agency quickly devoted more time to firearms 
enforcement—with criminal rather than regulatory enforcement taking up 
a larger share of that time.146 Likely as a result of this shift, cases 
recommended for prosecution by the ATF rose from 375 in 1968 to 3,283 
 
139. Id.  
140. Zimring, supra note 98, at 156. 
141. Id. 
142. Alicia L. Granse, Comment, Gun Control and the Color of the Law, 37 MINN. J.L. & INEQ. 
387, 397 (2019); see also Leah Boustan, Opinion, The Culprits Behind White Flight, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/opinion/white-flight.html 
[https://perma.cc/W5LW-HG8U]; T. Markus Funk, Gun Control and Economic Discrimination: The 
Melting-Point Case-in-Point, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 764, 800 (1995) (“[T]he name of this 
gun type derived from the racist phrase ‘[n****r-town] Saturday night,’ and the reference is to ‘ghetto 
control’ rather than gun control.”). 
143. Granse, supra note 142, at 409.   
144. Saturday Night Specials, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (Ronald Gottesman & Richard Maxwell 
Brown eds., 1999) (“A typical and traditional expression of official indifference to shootings and 
killings was ‘Oh well, that’s just [n****rtown] Saturday night,’ the implicit message being that those 
people’s lives are not worth anything . . . .”).  
145. See Zimring, supra note 98, at 154. 
146. Id. at 158–59. 
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in 1973.147 Indictments rose from 175 to 2,257, and convictions rose from 
89 to 1,719.148 
II. GUN CONTROL TODAY: THE RACIST IMPACT OF 
18 U.S.C. § 924(C) 
Recent data on federal firearm offense convictions shows that Black 
people are disproportionately penalized for firearm use and ownership. As 
of July 1, 2019, Black people made up 13.4% of the United States 
population, and white people made up 60.1%.149 However, in 2019, 53.2% 
of people convicted of a federal firearm offense were Black, whereas 
25.5% were white.150 
Passed as part of the GCA,151 § 924(c) helps maintain this disparity.152 
In its modern form, this section states the following: 
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise 
provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any 
person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if 
committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) 
for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United 
States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any 
such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the 
punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug 
trafficking crime . . . be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
not less than 5 years . . . .153 
Black people accused of violating § 924(c) “are much more likely to be 
convicted . . . than other groups, are more likely to be convicted of 
multiple counts, and are more likely to remain subject to the mandatory 
penalties at sentencing.”154 In 2020, 51% of people convicted under 
 
147. Id. at 159. 
148. Id. 
149. QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/ 
PST045219 [https://perma.cc/HLZ9-FL97]. 
150. CHARLES R. BREYER & DANNY C. REEVES, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 
AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 48 (2019), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-
sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y44C-AM4Q]. 
151. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
153. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
154. Paul J. Hofer, Review of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Report to Congress: Mandatory 
Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 193, 205 (2012).  
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§ 924(c) were Black.155 
The First Circuit commented on the malleability of the language 
criminalizing possession of a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking 
crime: “In most situations, a judge who [instructs the jury] in the terms of 
the statute—the ‘in furtherance of’ language—has substantial latitude as 
to whether and how to elaborate.”156 Because this language captures a 
wide range of activities,157 the statute gives prosecutors significant latitude 
in charging individuals with committing the crime. 
Prosecutorial discretion contributes to the disproportionate 
incarceration of Black people. Professor Angela J. Davis wrote that 
prosecutorial discretion “gives prosecutors more power than any other 
criminal justice officials, with practically no corresponding accountability 
to the public they serve.”158 Prosecutors’ broad and frequently 
unreviewable powers are “a major cause of racial inequality in the 
criminal justice system.”159 To a great extent, those powers reside in 
prosecutors’ “charging and bargaining decisions,” which “are huge 
determinants of sanctions”160—especially if a crime carries a mandatory 
minimum sentence.161 When a prosecutor charges a defendant with such 
a crime, “the defense attorney’s input is virtually irrelevant, and the 
judge’s ultimate power to determine the offender’s sentence is greatly, if 
not entirely, constrained.”162 Ninety-seven percent of people facing 
federal charges plead guilty or nolo contendere (no contest),163 as 
prosecutors frequently charge defendants with crimes that carry harsh 
sentences for the purpose of getting defendants to plead guilty to lesser 
charges.164 “Mandatory minimums . . . provide prosecutors the most 
 
155. Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Firearms Offenses, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Section_924c_FY20.pdf [https://perma.cc/48WF-EF7H]. 
156. United States v. Felton, 417 F.3d 97, 106 (1st Cir. 2005). 
157. See infra section II.B. 
158. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 13, 18 (1998).  
159. Id. at 17. 
160. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?, 102 
VA. L. REV. 1447, 1496–97 (2016). 
161. Mary Price, Weaponizing Justice: Mandatory Minimums, the Trial Penalty, and the Purposes 
of Punishment, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 309 (2019) (“In mandatory minimum cases, discretion to 
fashion a sentence is removed from the judge and given to the prosecutor.”). 
162. Bruce A. Green & Lara Bazelon, Restorative Justice from Prosecutors’ Perspective, 88 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2287, 2305 (2020). 
163. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION 9 (3d 
ed. 2018). 
164. See Price, supra note 161, at 312. 
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powerful tool they have to leverage” those pleas.165 When defendants go 
to trial and lose, prosecutors then pin the responsibility on them, 
contending that they “exercised poor judgment in rejecting the 
[offers].”166 
In the aggregate, prosecutors do not exercise their charging powers 
equitably. Federal prosecutors are twice as likely to charge Black people 
with crimes that carry mandatory minimum sentences, compared with 
similarly situated white people.167 In particular, a 2009 study found that 
Black and Latinx defendants were “disadvantaged in charging decisions” 
for federal weapons offenses, suggesting “that prosecutorial reliance on 
stereotypical patterned responses is particularly likely when both offender 
and offense categorizations feed into common attributions of 
dangerousness and culpability.”168 
A. Getting Tougher on Crime: The 1998 Amendment to the GCA 
In 1998, in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bailey v. United States,169 Congress added language criminalizing firearm 
possession “in furtherance of” specific crimes.170 In Bailey, officers who 
searched the defendant’s car found thirty grams of cocaine and a round of 
ammunition in the passenger compartment.171 They also found a pistol and 
“a large amount of cash” in the trunk.172 At trial, the prosecution 
introduced expert testimony that “drug dealers frequently carry a firearm 
to protect their drugs and money as well as themselves.”173 The jury 
convicted the defendant of “‘using’ a firearm during and in relation to a 
drug trafficking crime” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).174 However, 
the United States Supreme Court held that “evidence of the proximity and 
accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds” was not enough for a 
 
165. Id. at 310. 
166. Id. at 312. 
167. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINATING RACIAL INEQUITY IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16 (2015), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Black-Lives-Matter.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4S28-WKHH]. 
168. Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 
421 (2010). 
169. 516 U.S. 137 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 
Stat. 3469. 
170. United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001). 
171. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 139. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
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conviction.175 Rather, the statute required “evidence sufficient to show 
an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes 
the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.”176 
To arrive at this holding, the Court reversed the District of Columbia 
Circuit.177 In doing so, it examined the lower court’s interpretation of the 
word “use.”178 The D.C. Circuit had employed an “accessibility and 
proximity test,” holding that “one uses a gun” in violation of the statute 
“whenever one puts or keeps the gun in a particular place from which one 
(or one’s agent) can gain access to it if and when needed to facilitate a 
drug crime.”179 The Court criticized that standard, pointing out that it 
“provides almost no limitation on the kind of possession that would be 
criminalized.”180 By demanding a more rigorous factual basis for the 
conviction, Bailey restricted prosecutorial power to charge individuals 
with § 924(c) violations. 
In response, Congress expanded that power, adding the “in furtherance 
of” language to make the statute encompass possession that advanced or 
promoted the underlying drug trafficking offense.181 The amendment also 
imposed harsher penalties on people convicted under § 924(c), 
demonstrating that Congress was motivated by “[getting] tough on 
crime.”182  
Section 924(c)’s new language gave prosecutors more discretion to 
charge defendants and exact more severe sentences. Over the past two 
decades, judges have interpreted that language broadly.183 Both 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial interpretations of § 924(c) have 
aggravated disproportionality in who receives more severe charges and 
longer sentences.184 
 
175. Id. at 138, 150. 
176. Id. at 143.  
177. Id. at 151. 
178. Id. at 141. 
179. Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev’d, 516 U.S. 137 
(1995)).  
180. Id. at 144. 
181. United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, 
at 11–12 (1997)). 
182. Angela LaBuda Collins, Note, The Latest Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): Congressional 
Reaction to the Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Statute, 48 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1319, 1325 
(1999).  
183. See infra text accompanying notes 184–200.  
184. See supra text accompanying notes 155–64.  
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B. The Ambiguous Meaning of “in furtherance of” 
What does it mean to possess a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug 
trafficking crime? That short phrase has “spawned considerable case 
law,”185 but it remains ambiguous. For example, it is unclear “whether the 
‘in furtherance’ requirement refers to subjective purpose or objective 
potential (or whether either would do).”186 In fact, the congressional 
committee that first considered the language was unsure if the facts in 
Bailey would have been “sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession 
of a firearm ‘in furtherance of’ the commission of a drug trafficking 
offense.”187 
In theory, the language exists to “protect[] public safety” and 
“punish[] . . . drug trafficking crimes involving firearms.”188 In practice, 
when determining whether a defendant’s conduct meets the elements of 
the statute, appellate courts conduct loosely cabined fact-based inquiries 
that capture a surprisingly wide range of behavior, much of which has 
little to do with dealing drugs.189 
When the Supreme Court decided Bailey in 1995, it was wary of the 
potential breadth of an accessibility and proximity test as applied to the 
element of “use.”190 Nevertheless, since Congress amended § 924(c), the 
Ninth Circuit has employed a similar test when interpreting possession “in 
furtherance of,” finding that a prosecutor can prove it by showing a nexus 
between the firearm and the crime, “determined by examining, inter alia, 
the proximity, accessibility, and strategic location of the firearms in 
relation to the locus of drug activities.”191 
Other circuits’ interpretations also criminalize a broad range of firearm-
related conduct. The plain meaning of “furtherance” is “the act of 
 
185. United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). 
186. United States v. Felton, 417 F.3d 97, 104 (1st Cir. 2005). 
187. H.R. REP. NO. 105-344, at 12 (1997). 
188. See id. at 14 (describing the U.S. Department of Justice’s reasons for opposing the bill).  
189. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d 607, 613 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that if a 
defendant asserts on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to support their § 924(c) conviction, the 
appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution); infra notes 200–
200. 
190. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469. 
191. United States v. Rios, 449 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added); see also United 
States v. Mosley, 465 F.3d 412, 417 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Rios for the same proposition); United 
States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Thongsy, 577 F.3d 
1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Hector for the same proposition); United States v. Norwood, 603 
F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the government has provided adequate evidence of a 
nexus” if it shows that the gun is in the same room and within easy reach of a sizeable amount of 
drugs and trafficking paraphernalia).  
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furthering; advancement,”192 and most circuits use some variation of that 
definition.193 Additionally, in United States v. Ceballos-Torres,194 the 
Fifth Circuit introduced eight non-exclusive factors to “help determine 
whether a particular defendant’s possession furthers, advances, or helps 
forward a drug trafficking offense.”195 These factors are: (1) the type of 
drug activity the defendant is conducting; (2) the firearm’s accessibility; 
(3) the type of firearm; (4) whether the firearm is stolen; (5) whether the 
possession is legitimate or illegal; (6) whether the firearm is loaded; 
(7) proximity to drugs or profits from the sale of drugs; and (8) “the time 
and circumstances under which the gun is found.”196 The majority of 
circuits now apply these factors.197 The Ninth Circuit has explicitly 
rejected them, asserting that it “will not resort to a checklist that has little 
relation to the crime charged.”198 The Eighth Circuit has held that just two 
factors can be enough: a conviction for possession with intent to distribute 
a controlled substance, combined with a conviction for unlawfully 
possessing a firearm as a felon.199 
To appreciate the practical implications of the circuit courts’ broad 
 
192. United States v. Lopez, 477 F.3d 1110, 1116 n.22 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Furtherance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 509 (11th ed. 
2003)). 
193. See United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he evidence must 
demonstrate that possession of the firearm advanced or helped forward a drug trafficking crime.”); 
United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002) (“We agree with our sister circuits that 
adopting this interpretation of ‘furtherance’ is consistent with Congress’ intent in amending 
§ 924(c).”); United States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626, 632 (5th Cir. 2018) (stating that the government 
had to prove that the defendant’s possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward the 
drug trafficking offense); United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The term 
‘furtherance’ should be understood in its ordinary or natural meaning, which, according to the 
dictionary, is ‘a helping forward: advancement, promotion.’” (quoting Furtherance, WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1981)); United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 
814 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he natural meaning of ‘in furtherance of’ is ‘furthering, advancing or helping 
forward.’” (citing United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 2005)); United States v. 
Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (“No evidence demonstrates that [the defendant’s] 
possession furthered, promoted or advanced his illegal drug activity.”); United States v. Timmons, 
283 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] conviction under § 924(c) requires that the prosecution 
establish that the firearm helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced the drug trafficking.”); United 
States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (listing factors for determining whether possession 
furthers, advances, or helps forward a drug trafficking crime). 
194. 218 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2000). 
195. Id. at 414. 
196. Id. at 414–15. 
197. See Sparrow, 371 F.3d at 853; Lomax, 293 F.3d at 705; Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462; United 
States v. Duran, 407 F.3d 828, 840 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1206–
08 (10th Cir. 2001); Timmons, 283 F.3d at 1253. 
198. United States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). 
199. United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 1044, 1050 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d 
607, 614 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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tests, it is helpful to look at examples of the activities they criminalize. 
For instance, according to the Ninth Circuit, a person possesses a firearm 
in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime by keeping a handgun under a 
futon couch in an apartment from which they sell drugs.200 The court 
explained that the “apartment was small—less than 700 square feet,” and 
“the loaded firearm was located directly on the path [the defendant] 
traveled in conducting the drug transactions.”201 According to the Seventh 
Circuit, a person possesses a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime by attempting to buy ten kilograms of cocaine while sitting in an 
SUV, which has a loaded gun in a compartment that “could be opened 
only by following a sequence of steps that would take about half a minute 
to complete: start the car, press the defrost button, push down the button 
to open a rear window, and place a magnet close to the ignition.”202 
According to the First Circuit, a person possesses a firearm in furtherance 
of a drug trafficking crime by having an unloaded handgun “in a plastic 
bag in a drawer under [a] bed” with the drawer “blocked by a duffel bag, 
a trash can, and a box of books,” even if the house contains no 
ammunition.203 In each example, the gun was far from readily available, 
but the court found that the defendant possessed the firearm in furtherance 
of drug trafficking. 
C. Why Defenses Rooted in the Right to Self-Defense Fail 
If someone happens to keep a gun in proximity to drug sales, have they 
violated § 924(c)? In their published opinions, judges claim that the 
answer is no.204 Nevertheless, appellate opinions demonstrate that the 
answer is often yes, even where the defendant puts forth a plausible, legal 
reason for possessing a firearm.205 
 
200. United States v. Hector, 474 F.3d 1150, 1153, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2007). 
201. Id.  
202. United States v. Brown, 724 F.3d 801, 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2013). 
203. United States v. Grace, 367 F.3d 29, 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2004).  
204. See, e.g., United States v. Krouse, 370 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Evidence that a 
defendant merely possessed a firearm at a drug trafficking crime scene, without proof that the weapon 
furthered an independent drug trafficking offense, is insufficient to support a conviction under 
§ 924(c).”); United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The ‘mere 
presence’ test is one based on generality—anytime a drug dealer possesses a gun, that possession is 
in furtherance, because drug dealers generally use guns to protect themselves and their drugs. What 
is instead required is evidence more specific to the particular defendant, showing that his or her 
possession actually furthered the drug trafficking offense.”); United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 
375 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Wahl argues correctly that even under the amended statute, the mere presence 
of a firearm at the scene of drug trafficking is insufficient to support a conviction under 
section 924(c)(1).”). 
205. See infra text accompanying notes 224–42. 
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The lack of attention to whether defendants have criminal intent is 
troubling. There is “a longstanding presumption, traceable to the common 
law, that Congress intends to require a defendant to possess a culpable 
mental state regarding ‘each of the statutory elements that criminalize 
otherwise innocent conduct.’”206 The Supreme Court has applied this 
presumption “even when Congress does not specify any [intent] in the 
statutory text,”207 and “even where ‘the most grammatical reading of the 
statute’” does not support it.208 Some cases interpreting § 924(c) display a 
self-conscious recognition of this principle. In United States v. Mann,209 a 
rare case where the court vacated the defendants’ § 924(c) convictions, 
the Ninth Circuit pointed out that “Congress has not made mere 
possession, when it occurs contemporaneously with drug manufacture, a 
strict liability crime.”210 Nevertheless, examining the “in furtherance of” 
language as applied to the possession element shows that courts do not 
meaningfully inquire into defendants’ mental states. While people 
accused of possessing firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking crimes 
frequently invoke self-defense to explain the guns in their homes, courts 
often reject their explanations, even when the main link between the guns 
and the drugs is simply proximity.211 
This persistent rejection of defenses based on personal protection has 
serious implications for Black firearm owners. Personal protection is the 
most common justification for owning guns.212 The Supreme Court found 
that justification lawful in District of Columbia v. Heller,213 where it held 
that people have a constitutional right to possess and use handguns for 
self-defense in their homes.214 That right is of special consequence for 
Black Americans, who have historically lacked the privilege of relying on 
 
206. Rehaif v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (quoting United States v. 
X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)). 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 2197 (quoting X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 70).  
209. 389 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2004). 
210. Id. at 880. It is worth noting that the defendants were white. Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU 
OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ [https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by 
Name” tab; then type “Tomi Mann” or “James Pollender” into the search bar; then select “Search”). 
While the court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the type of gun at issue was “generally 
lacking in usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes,” it did not explicitly address the 
subjects of hunting, shooting for sport, or self-defense. Mann, 389 F.3d at 880. 
211. See infra text accompanying notes 225–44. 
212. Ruth Igielnik & Anna Brown, Key Takeaways on Americans’ Views of Guns and Gun 
Ownership, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 22, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/06/22/key-takeaways-on-americans-views-of-guns-and-gun-ownership/ 
[https://perma.cc/GP2G-9EDR].  
213. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
214. Id. at 636. 
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the government for help in the face of danger.215 
While the Ku Klux Klan no longer terrorizes Black communities on a 
massive scale, today, Black individuals are disproportionately likely to be 
victims of violent crime,216 a state of affairs rooted in institutional racism. 
Between 1890 and 1970, millions of Black households moved from rural 
to urban areas.217 A combination of targeted violence and housing 
discrimination led to the concentration of Black families in segregated, 
economically under-resourced neighborhoods.218 While much of that 
housing discrimination has been outlawed, residential segregation 
persists: in 2010, a third of Black metropolitan residents lived under 
conditions of hypersegregation, and less than 1% of Black metropolitan 
residents lived under conditions of low or no segregation.219 Segregation 
and concentrated disadvantage account for high levels of violent crime in 
many Black communities.220 A 2010 study found that the average rates of 
violent crime in predominantly Black neighborhoods were 327% higher 
than in predominantly white neighborhoods.221 A lack of confidence in 
law enforcement, the institution that is supposed to provide protection 
from violent crime, compounds the problem: 48% of Black people have 
very little or no confidence that local police will treat Black and white 
people equally, compared with 12% of white people.222 While one could 
contend that violence in Black neighborhoods lends support for greater 
firearms restrictions, “another, perhaps stronger case can be made that a 
society with a dismal record of protecting a people has a dubious claim on 
the right to disarm them.”223 
To understand how courts brush aside claims of self-defense, it is 
helpful to look at specific cases. For example, in United States v. 
 
215. Cottrol et al., supra note 81, at 359. 
216. RUTH D. PETERSON, LAUREN J. KRIVO & JOHN HAGAN, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS: 
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL DIVIDE 14 (2010).  
217. Stephen L. Ross, Understanding Racial Segregation: What Is Known About the Effect of 
Housing Discrimination?, in NEIGHBORHOOD AND LIFE CHANCES: HOW PLACE MATTERS IN 
MODERN AMERICA 288, 289 (Harriet B. Newburger et al. eds., 2011). 
218. See id. at 289–90; Douglas S. Massey, Still the Linchpin: Segregation and Stratification in the 
USA, 12 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 (2020).  
219. Massey, supra note 218, at 3, 8. In 1989, researchers “coined the term ‘hypersegregation’ to 
describe metropolitan areas in which [Black people] were highly segregated” on multiple geographic 
dimensions. Id. at 4. 
220. PETERSON ET AL., supra note 216, at 79.  
221. Id. 
222. Laura Santhanam, Two-Thirds of Black Americans Don’t Trust the Police to Treat Them 
Equally. Most White Americans Do., PBS NEWSHOUR (June 5, 2020, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/two-thirds-of-black-americans-dont-trust-the-police-to-treat-
them-equally-most-white-americans-do [https://perma.cc/2NHT-JQ8L]. 
223. Cottrol et al., supra note 81, at 361. 
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Bryant,224 the Second Circuit upheld a § 924(c) conviction where a Black 
defendant225 admitted to selling narcotics and owning a shotgun, but 
explained that he had bought the shotgun for protection after a robbery at 
his residence.226 In that case, officers searched the defendant’s master 
bedroom and recovered a loaded shotgun from underneath the bed, as well 
as cash, drugs, and drug paraphernalia from various parts of the room.227 
After the search, the defendant gave a statement to the police. He said he 
had lived at his residence for about three years, and that he had recently 
started selling cocaine for his roommate: “[a]bout a month ago VJ started 
selling cocaine out of my house. If VJ is not home and someone wants 
some cocaine I will sell that cocaine. Two months after I moved in I was 
robbed. That is why I have a shotgun.”228 The defendant’s ownership of 
the shotgun was legal, and there was no evidence of him brandishing or 
discharging the firearm in public.229 Moreover, as his statement makes 
clear, he bought it several years before he began selling narcotics from his 
residence.230 
The defendant challenged § 924(c) as unconstitutional because it 
“burdened his . . . right to keep and bear arms in defense of his own 
home.”231 The court, while acknowledging the “‘core lawful purpose’ of 
self-defense,” rejected this challenge.232 It held that “once Bryant engaged 
in ‘an illegal home business,’ he was no longer a law-abiding citizen using 
the firearm for a lawful purpose, and his conviction for possession of a 
firearm under these circumstances does not burden his Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.”233 
Another Second Circuit case illustrates the ways courts treat § 924(c) 
defendants who invoke the right to self-defense. In United States v. 
Lewter,234 the court upheld a § 924(c) conviction where officers found 
drugs and cash in the defendant’s dresser and a pistol under his bed.235 As 
 
224. 711 F.3d 364 (2d Cir. 2013). 
225. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ 
[https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “Ron Bryant” into the 
search bar; then select “Search”). 
226. Bryant, 711 F.3d at 367.  
227. Id. at 366.  
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 367. 
230. Id. at 367–68.  
231. Id. at 365. 
232. Id. at 370 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008)). 
233. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 
2009)).  
234. 402 F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 2005). 
235. Id. at 321.  
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in Bryant, the defendant was Black.236 He argued that there was 
insufficient evidence that he possessed a firearm in furtherance of drug 
trafficking.237 He asserted that he did not sell drugs inside his residence, 
he lived in a tough neighborhood, and the jury had no basis for choosing 
between the possibility that his possession furthered his illegal activities 
and the possibility that his possession was for personal safety.238 
Testimony at trial established that the area immediately around the 
apartment was “particularly dangerous,” and that “the problems were so 
severe that there had been a video surveillance system set up to monitor 
it.”239 
However, the court held “[t]he evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury’s verdict that [the defendant] possessed the gun to defend his drug 
stash.”240 First, the court defined “in furtherance of” broadly: “‘[I]n 
furtherance’ means that the gun afforded some advantage (actual or 
potential, real or contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug 
trafficking.”241 Next, the court pointed to the following facts: the 
defendant stored the pistol within feet of his stash and within his reach; 
the firearm appeared to have an obliterated serial number, which is illegal; 
and the pistol “was loaded with hollow-point bullets.”242 The court then 
reasoned that the latter two factors “militate against an inference of 
innocent use, such as target practice or hunting.”243 Moreover, it added 
that “possession for personal protection does not preclude possession in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense,” and that here, “the person to be 
protected was a drug dealer, and among the things being protected were a 
saleable quantity of drugs.”244 
By contrast, courts faced with § 924(c) cases readily accept hunting, 
target shooting, and collecting guns as examples of lawful reasons for 
owning firearms.245 Unlike self-defense, these activities are largely 
associated with white communities. The United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service conducted a national survey in 2016 and found that 97% of 
 
236. See Find an Inmate., FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ 
[https://perma.cc/BQ9A-39GS] (select the “Find by Name” tab; then type “Coleridge Lewter” into 
the search bar; then select “Search”). 
237. Lewter, 402 F.3d at 321–22. 
238. Id. 
239. Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 9–10, Lewter, 402 F.3d 319 (No. 04-
2546-CR).  




244. Id. at 323.  
245. See infra text accompanying notes 249–52.  
Itah12 - Itah_Ready for Publisher (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:22 PM 
1218 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1191 
 
hunters were white.246 A 2008 study found that 87% of active sport 
shooters were white.247 According to one 2006 study, the typical gun 
collector is a white, married man over the age of forty.248 And a 2009 
ethnographic study found that “Guns Don’t Kill People It’s Those Dang 
Angry Minorities” was a popular t-shirt slogan in the gun-collecting 
community.249 
Courts have explicitly stated that these activities—hunting, target 
shooting, and gun collection—make firearm possession by people 
engaged in drug trafficking justifiable. In United States v. Mackey,250 the 
Sixth Circuit listed factors that would help “distinguish possession in 
furtherance of a crime from innocent possession of a wall-mounted 
antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard.”251 Several 
other circuit courts have quoted that language.252 In Ceballos-Torres, the 
Fifth Circuit noted that “a drug trafficker who engages in target shooting 
or in hunting game” will be unlikely to violate § 924(c) “by keeping a 
pistol for that purpose that is otherwise locked and inaccessible.”253 In 
United States v. Thongsy,254 the Ninth Circuit held that an instructional 
error in a § 924(c) case was harmless, noting that a Drug Enforcement 
Administration Agent testified that the defendant’s firearm “would not be 
used for hunting.”255 Even Congress seemed to consider white-coded 
activities when it amended the statute in 1998. For example, one 
representative expressed concern that under the statute, a hunter who 
possessed a hunting rifle and a small amount of drugs could face 
 
246. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 2016 NATIONAL SURVEY OF FISHING, HUNTING, AND 
WILDLIFE-ASSOCIATED RECREATION 33 (2018), https://www.fws.gov/wsfrprograms/subpages/ 
nationalsurvey/nat_survey2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X73-AGKZ].  
247. RESPONSIVE MGMT. & NAT’L SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND., THE FUTURE OF HUNTING AND THE 
SHOOTING SPORTS: RESEARCH-BASED RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION STRATEGIES 32 (2008), 
https://responsivemanagement.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Future_Hunting_Shooting_ 
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JRF-E3SJ]. 
248. Leon Anderson & Jimmy D. Taylor, Standing Out While Fitting in: Serious Leisure Identities 
and Aligning Actions Among Skydivers and Gun Collectors, 39 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 34, 39 
(2010).  
249. JIMMY D. TAYLOR, AMERICAN GUN CULTURE: COLLECTORS, SHOWS, AND THE STORY OF THE 
GUN 122 (2009).  
250. 265 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2001). 
251. Id. at 462. 
252. See United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sparrow, 
371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004). 
253. United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2000). 
254. 577 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2009). 
255. Id. at 1043. 
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punishment.256 
In sum, federal courts interpret § 924(c) in ways that increase Black 
defendants’ vulnerability to incarceration and disarmament. First, the 
interpretations encourage prosecutorial discretion, a major contributor to 
racially disparate outcomes in the criminal legal system. Second, the 
interpretations penalize defendants who invoke the right to self-defense 
while shielding defendants who own guns for recreation. Because 
structural racism renders Black people more vulnerable to violence, and 
because recreational gun users are overwhelmingly white, these 
interpretations disadvantage Black defendants who choose to go to trial 
rather than simply pleading guilty. As a source of harm for Black firearm 
owners, § 924(c) requires a closer look. 
III. INCREMENTALIST AND ABOLITIONIST APPROACHES TO 
CHANGE 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street 
Journal all wrote about 2020 as a period of racial reckoning.257 As we 
grapple with institutional racism, we must take care not to leave anyone 
behind—including people accused of dealing drugs. 
This Comment proposes two different ways to address § 924(c)’s 
disparate impact on Black people, one incrementalist and one abolitionist. 
First, to reduce the unstructured discretion that penalizes Black 
defendants, courts should require a criminal scienter258 connection 
between firearm possession and drug trafficking. Alternatively, to 
eliminate that unstructured discretion entirely, Congress should repeal the 
language in § 924(c) that criminalizes possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 
 
256. Collins, supra note 182, at 1353 n.217 (citing 144 CONG. REC. H533 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1998) 
(statement of Rep. Maxine Waters)).  
257. See John Eligon & Audra D. S. Burch, After a Summer of Racial Reckoning, Race Is on the 
Ballot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/us/racial-justice-
elections.html [https://perma.cc/L3RP-2SD4]; Paul Farhi & Sarah Ellison, Ignited by Public Protests, 
American Newsrooms Are Having Their Own Racial Reckoning, WASH. POST (June 13, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/ignited-by-public-protests-american-newsrooms-
are-having-their-own-racial-reckoning/2020/06/12/be622bce-a995-11ea-94d2-
d7bc43b26bf9_story.html [https://perma.cc/SV8E-FJVJ]; Pamela Newkirk, After 2020, How Do We 
Move Forward on Race?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2020, 11:00 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-2020-how-do-we-move-forward-on-race-11607961601 
[https://perma.cc/U9J9-TN9E]. 
258. Black’s Law Dictionary defines scienter as a “degree of knowledge that makes a person legally 
responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done 
knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment.” Scienter, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
Itah12 - Itah_Ready for Publisher (Do Not Delete) 10/11/2021  4:22 PM 
1220 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:1191 
 
A. The Incrementalist Approach: Applying the Presumption of 
Scienter to § 924(c) 
Applied to the element of possession, the phrase “in furtherance of” 
allows for a broad interpretation of the statute, one that encourages the 
disproportionate criminalization of firearm ownership by Black people 
and members of other marginalized groups. Firearm possession is a 
passive act, and “in furtherance of” does little to limit the context in which 
such possession breaks the law. 
At the very least, courts should prevent possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking from becoming a de facto strict-liability 
crime259 by interpreting § 924(c)(1)(A) more narrowly. Courts should 
require prosecutors to prove a genuine connection between the firearm 
and the drug-trafficking activity. Doing so would limit prosecutors’ 
discretion to charge defendants under § 924(c) and thus reduce the 
potential for racially disparate outcomes. 
When determining whether a defendant possessed a firearm in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, a court should not ask whether, 
objectively, the firearm had the potential to further drug trafficking. 
Rather, the court should put itself in the defendant’s shoes and ask 
whether, subjectively, the defendant possessed the firearm for the purpose 
of furthering the specific drug trafficking crime the prosecution claims 
took place. Because this inquiry would require the court to delve into the 
defendant’s subjective reasons for possessing the gun, it would make it 
likelier that a defendant convicted of violating § 924(c) truly intended to 
use the gun to advance or promote the drug trafficking crime at issue in 
the case. It would also make it harder for courts to brush aside defendants’ 
assertion of the right, reaffirmed by Heller, to possess a firearm in one’s 
home for protection—a right the United States has a history of denying 
Black Americans. 
Under a subjective standard, the defendant in Bryant would have likely 
faced a different outcome. The court would not have been able to 
announce that the defendant “was no longer a law-abiding citizen using 
the firearm for a lawful purpose” simply because he dealt drugs.260 Rather, 
the prosecution would have had to affirmatively prove that the defendant 
possessed the shotgun with the intention of using it to promote his drug 
trafficking activities. The record does not show that the defendant’s 
roommate talked with him about using the shotgun to protect the drugs. It 
 
259. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a strict-liability crime as an “offense for which the action 
alone is enough to warrant a conviction, with no need to prove a mental state.” Crime, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
260. United States v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 370 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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does not show that any of the defendant’s buyers saw the shotgun or even 
knew of its existence. It merely shows that the shotgun was in the same 
room as the drugs, paraphernalia, and cash. Given that the defendant told 
officers that he bought the shotgun for self-defense well before he began 
selling cocaine, the prosecution would have had to tie ownership of the 
firearm to drug trafficking much more rigorously to secure a conviction. 
While Lewter presents a closer case, the outcome might have been 
different under a subjective standard. In Lewter, officers found drugs, 
cash, and a pistol in the defendant’s apartment. Mr. Lewter argued that 
there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he possessed a gun 
to further drug trafficking rather than to protect himself from the dangers 
of his neighborhood. Using the test proposed here, the court would not 
have been able to hold that a person possesses a firearm in furtherance of 
drug trafficking if the gun only affords “some advantage (actual or 
potential, real or contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes” of selling 
drugs.261 Under this definition, a person violates § 924(c) whenever their 
gun could have helped them sell drugs, regardless of whether they 
intended to use the gun for that purpose. 
Moreover, the Lewter court’s point that “the person to be protected was 
a drug dealer”262 would be irrelevant. The fact that a person both owns a 
gun and sells drugs does not, standing alone, show intent to use the gun to 
further the sale of drugs. Courts have repeatedly recognized this fact by 
noting that a drug dealer can own a hunting rifle or an antique firearm 
without violating § 924(c).263 They should explicitly extend that reasoning 
to drug dealers’ ownership of firearms for self-defense. Trafficking 
controlled substances may not be a lawful occupation, but it is ultimately 
something a person does for money. It is not an identity or an immutable 
characteristic. A person who meets their financial obligations in this way 
is no less deserving of protection from neighborhood violence than a 
person who has never so much as jaywalked. 
Unfortunately, a subjective standard likely would not have helped Mr. 
Bell, whose story appears in the Introduction. Officers said they saw Mr. 
Bell reach for a gun while crack cocaine belonging to him sat nearby. The 
record lacks information about why Mr. Bell purchased the gun, or why 
he kept it at his partner’s home. While there is room to argue that trying 
to grab a gun when strangers barge into one’s bedroom is consistent with 
self-defense, a jury would be entitled to find that Mr. Bell was attempting 
to use the gun to defend the drugs. Mr. Bell’s case demonstrates the limits 
 
261. United States v. Lewter, 402 F.3d 319, 321–22 (2d Cir. 2005). 
262. Id. at 323. 
263. See supra section II.C. 
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of reinterpreting statutory language that Congress designed to put more 
people in prison. 
B. The Abolitionist Approach: Amending § 924(c) 
When Congress amended § 924(c) in 1998, the tough-on-crime 
approach to reducing violence was in full swing.264 Today, political 
leaders question the wisdom of that approach. President Joe Biden, who 
once “spearheaded many of the laws” that “fueled a population explosion 
in federal prisons,”265 campaigned on a platform of reducing 
incarceration.266 Two House Representatives have backed the BREATHE 
Act267: written by Black Lives Matter activists, the bill proposes to defund 
“large swaths of the federal law enforcement apparatus,” eliminate 
mandatory minimum sentences, and begin working toward the 
abolishment of prisons.268 A bill that drastically shrinks the scope of the 
criminal legal system would have been unthinkable just a few years ago, 
but a June 2021 poll showed that the BREATHE Act is popular among 
likely voters.269 Given this shift in thinking around what it means to keep 
communities safe, the time is ripe to revisit the GCA. Congress should 
remove the language in § 924(c) that punishes possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking. 
Eliminating this language is not a particularly radical step. Even if 
Congress were to decriminalize possessing a firearm in furtherance of 
drug trafficking, federal prosecutors would still have the power to charge 
individuals for using or carrying firearms “during and in relation to 
any . . . drug trafficking crime.”270 For example, a person would still break 
 
264. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern 
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 831 (2000) (“The percentage of the population incarcerated, the 
length of sentences imposed, and the number of offenses which carried automatic prison sentences 
regardless of mitigating circumstances all increased drastically during a relatively short period of 
time.”).  
265. German Lopez, Biden’s Secret Weapon for Criminal Justice Reform, VOX (Feb. 26, 2021, 
12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/2/26/22303071/biden-clemency-pardon-criminal-justice-
reform-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/5UNK-NMCT]. 
266. The Biden Plan for Strengthening America’s Commitment to Justice, BIDEN HARRIS, 
https://joebiden.com/Justice/ [https://perma.cc/3C2R-QLPM].  
267. H.R. 585, 116th Cong. (2019). 
268. Sean Collins, Now Is the Time to Revolutionize Policing, VOX (Feb. 22, 2021, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/22263084/breathe-act-revolutionize-policing-pressley-tlaib 
[https://perma.cc/T7TM-EBLR]. 
269. Li Zhou, This Progressive Police Reform Bill Is Pretty Popular, VOX (June 21, 2021, 8:30 
AM), https://www.vox.com/2021/6/21/22535672/breathe-act-progressive-police-reform-bill 
[https://perma.cc/KTQ3-YUJP]. 
270. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  
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the law by putting a gun on display during a drug transaction.271 Moreover, 
trafficking drugs would continue to be a standalone crime—one that 
carries its own mandatory minimums, depending on factors like the types 
and quantities of drugs involved.272 Far from wiping all gun crimes off the 
books, this reform would simply erase a provision of § 924(c) that carries 
great potential for abuse. Without the provision, prosecutors would have 
far less power to coerce firearm owners during plea bargaining, and 
appellate judges would have a harder time upholding convictions where 
defendants legitimately asserted the right to self-defense. 
By getting rid of a powerful charging tool, this reform would constitute 
a small but meaningful step toward addressing racial disparities in the 
enforcement of federal firearm laws. It would also give the government 
one less way to punish Black Americans for exercising their Second 
Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The firearm is a potent symbol of political power. To the English 
colonizers, the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters, and the Black Panthers 
alike, guns represented self-determination. Having a gun meant having the 
ability to protect oneself, be it from a tyrannical government bent on 
maintaining the status quo, a Klansman bent on terrorizing people of 
color, or a police officer bent on carrying out an arrest by any means 
necessary. Given the firearm’s symbolic significance, it is important to 
notice who gets to own guns and who does not, regardless of one’s 
opinions about the proper role of weapons in an industrialized society. 
While the GCA appears racially neutral, its origins and impact 
demonstrate that, under the guise of disarming criminals, it unjustly 
disarms Black Americans. Greater prosecutorial discretion leads to 
greater disparities in the charging and incarceration of Black people. By 
giving prosecutors the power to charge an individual with a crime 
whenever they keep a gun near their drugs—even if they possess as few 
as seven grams, a quantity arguably consistent with personal use—
§ 924(c) leads to the excessive criminalization of Black firearm owners. 
In amending § 924(c) after Bailey, Congress expressed its intention to 
fight crime, but that intention must be balanced with the need to refrain 
from punishing people who lack culpable mental states. It must also be 
balanced with the need to question laws that disparately impact 
 
271. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469 (amending § 924(c) to criminalize possession of a firearm 
“in furtherance of” drug trafficking). 
272. 21 U.S.C. § 841.  
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marginalized groups. 
Courts can bring a small measure of balance to the GCA by requiring 
prosecutors to establish a criminal scienter connection between the 
possession of a firearm and the trafficking of drugs. Congress can go 
further by amending § 924(c) to eliminate the vaguely defined crime of 
possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” drug trafficking. In comparison 
with the scope of the criminal legal system, these reforms are narrow. 
Nevertheless, either would have a meaningful impact on the lives of 
individuals—particularly Black individuals—accused of violating 
§ 924(c). 
 
